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ABSTRACT
Recent research has posited that retributiveness is an individual level disposition that can help us 
understand foreign policy preferences (e.g. Liberman 2006, Liberman 2007, Liberman in press, 
Stein n.d.). However, previous research is limited in two related respects. First, previous research 
relies on correlational data, blunting our ability to make clear causal inferences. Also, 
retributiveness is not made theoretically distinct from general hawkishness. In this paper, I 
present results from two experiments to refine our understanding of how retributiveness can 
affect support for use of the military. In the first experiment, I examine how retributiveness 
affects support for greater military commitment across a number of potential missions. In the 
second experiment, I examine how retributiveness interacts with different rhetorical justifications 
for military endeavors (e.g. punishing transgressors versus eliminating a foreign policy threat).
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1 INTRODUCTION
A large range of work exists which argues that public support for war is dependent on a 
combination of situational factors and various dispositional perspectives.  Situational factors 
such as perceived risks, elite cohesion and the presence of American interests have long been 
seen as vital to the prospects of any war seeking democratic government gaining the necessary 
support to carry out their plans.  Recent works have also suggested that the prospect of success, 
whether viewed in general or in the context of specific types of missions, is particularly salient. 
If the situational factors align correctly, then even those who would otherwise be opposed to war 
can be persuaded that it is the correct course of action.  What is less clear is how specific 
dispositional characteristics might affect support for wars that have less clearly defined 
American interests or outcomes that are likely to be considered successful.  If success is not 
clear, or the goal of the mission is ambiguous, how will different dispositional traits affect 
support for war?
Previous studies of mass public foreign policy attitudes have provided conflicting 
evidence.  Whereas public opinion of foreign policy was once regarded as volatile (Almond 
1950; Lippman 1955) and lacking structure (Converse 1964), more recent works have sought to 
clarify the intellectual structures that may explain how the public will develop preferences about 
foreign policy.  Page and Shapiro (1988) found that aggregate public opinion was in fact far 
more stable than the Almond-Lippman consensus suggested.  Wiffkopf (1986, 1990) developed a 
two dimensional model encompassing support for, or opposition to, accommodative and militant 
interactions with the world.  While Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) developed a hierarchical model 
to assess how general attitudes may affect the public’s foreign policy preferences.1   Although the 
1 For other hierarchical models relating to political attitudes see: Malka, Soto 2011 and Schwartz et al 2010
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methodologies and theoretical underpinnings of these authors have often varied, the underlying 
similarity between them suggests that the public is often unaware of the specific details of 
foreign affairs, but is generally capable of employing various heuristic tools to understand and 
form opinions about foreign policy (Holsti, 1992).     
Further studies are necessary to assess how these varying cognitive frameworks interact 
with situational variables in the minds of the public.   Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) 
found that in experimental conditions, both military assertiveness and the isolationist tendencies 
of respondents proved to be important dispositional factors affecting support for conflicts.  While 
military assertiveness tends to lead to higher levels of support for many conflicts, its positive 
effects are mitigated when American interests are lacking.  
In order to overcome even the most ardent isolationists, conflicts must cross national 
boundaries and involve a nation that could ultimately threaten the United States (Hermann et al, 
1999; 558).  As is the case with militarism, American interests must be present, and the threat 
must be significant.  The research shows that respondents would rather stop a formidable 
adversary early, rather than later when they may become even stronger. 
Due to the dangers associated with most military missions, the public is generally risk 
averse when they must first consider going to war.  Prospect theory posits that individuals view 
potential outcomes to various actions from their perspective of the status quo.  If an action is 
undertaken to gain something with the potential for loss if it fails, then many people are unlikely 
to support the action.  On the other hand, if the status quo is being threatened, then many people 
will become much more accepting of risk in order to maintain their current holdings.  In essence, 
this suggests that people generally tend to be loss-averse (Boettcher, 2004: 333).  
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This tendency towards loss aversion has a significant impact on support for military 
conflicts because the benefits of any foreign policy initiative are often abstract and remote.  At 
the same time, the potential drawbacks to a conflict, such as weakened economic performance or 
casualties, are more likely to have a direct impact on the lives of the public.  As a result, military 
campaigns are viewed with skepticism or suspicion.  However, a large body of work has been 
developed detailing the types of conflicts that are most likely to overcome public skepticism and 
ultimately receive support.
Nincic (1997) argues from the perspective of prospect theory and suggests that foreign 
policy goals which protect American interests, such as securing energy supplies and protecting 
American business interests abroad, will garner more support than promotive policies, such as 
strengthening the United Nations or promoting democracy abroad, which would require an 
expenditure of presently held resources towards a goal that might not be achieved (Nincic, 1997: 
100-101).  Bruce Jentleson (1992: Jentleson and Britton 1998) argues that the principle policy 
objective (PPO) is a significant factor in determining whether the public will accept American 
military involvement in a crisis.  In particular, when the PPO is foreign policy restraint, such as 
preventing one nation from invading another, the public will be much more supportive than in a 
situation in which the PPO is internal political change, such as efforts to alter the domestic 
political institutions of another nation (Jentleson 1992: 53).  Patricia Sullivan’s (2007) findings 
can be used to support the arguments of Jentleson, as she explains that missions which require a 
higher level of coercion against a foreign nation are less likely to succeed than those which 
merely require brute force, such as the acquisition or defense of territory (Sullivan 2007: 
504,511).    
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Whatever terms are used to describe the different types of missions that are most likely to 
garner public support, the common underlying factor is a greater probability of success.  Indeed, 
recent work has found that public beliefs about the likelihood of success are one of the most 
significant factors affecting support for any conflict (Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, 2009:123). 
Another important factor affecting support is the elite discourse surrounding a conflict or 
a potential conflict.  Berinsky (2007) argues that individuals within the public will often rely on 
the positions of elites to provide a reference point amidst the opinions surrounding war 
(Berinsky, 2007:978).   Gelpi et al. also found find that higher levels of elite cohesion proved to 
be beneficial.  The strongest levels of support came to conflicts that received unanimous support 
from domestic elites (the President, as well as bipartisan support in Congress) as well as 
international support from allies such as NATO and international organizations such as the 
United Nations (Gelpi et al., 2009: 117).
However, aside from the commonly researched situational and dispositional factors, there 
are other dispositional perspectives that may help to explain support for war.  One potential area 
worth exploring is how differing conceptions of justice affect support for war.  In particular, it is 
likely that those who support punitive justice will be more hawkish in some situations than those 
who view justice in different ways.  Recent work has suggested that democracies which still use 
the death penalty are also more likely to support the use of military force abroad (Stein 2011).  In 
the case of the United States, Liberman (2006) discovered that death penalty supporters were 
more likely to support both the 1991 and 2003 Persian Gulf Wars when they were framed as a 
war of good versus evil (Liberman, 2006; 711).  
These works raise the possibility that the desire to punish wrongdoers may have a 
powerful impact on whether or not supporters of punitive justice will support specific conflicts 
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that may otherwise be inadvisable.  If that is the case, then how will this desire for punitive 
justice relate to other dispositional tendencies, such as isolationism, militarism, and ideology, as 
well as specific situational factors?  Is it possible that the desire to punish might mitigate the 
negative impact of other factors in a potential conflict?  In order to measure the relationship 
between various dispositional frameworks and situational factors which may affect them, a 
survey was conducted which included an experiment that sought to test out the relationship 
between the wide array of influences that affect public support for war.  The data should show 
that among those who favor punitive punishments, there will be greater levels of support for 
foreign conflicts that seek to punish other nations for their actions rather than merely seeking 
peace or restitution. 
2 UNDERSTANDING THE PUNITIVE MINDSET
The idea of war as a means of punishment is hardly a new concept; it has been used as a 
justification throughout history.  As the international community has developed and matured, 
particularly in the aftermath of World War II and the formation of the United Nations, the idea of 
one state punishing another for its wrongdoings has become increasingly unacceptable.  The UN 
Charter specifically prohibits its member nations from taking action against other states that 
would violate the core principles of international peace.  Instead the emphasis is placed on 
collective action, authorized by the Security Council to defend member states from acts of 
aggression.2  
Of course seeking justice through punishment had detractors long before the modern era. 
In Book I of the Republic, there was a brief discussion of retributive justice.  Despite the 
2 See Articles 2 (4), 1 (1), and Chapter VII for a more thorough review of UN principles :
 http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml
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argument advanced by Polemarchus claiming that justice meant benefitting one’s friends and 
harming one’s enemies, Plato was skeptical, claiming that when humans are harmed, they will 
inevitably become worse.  Making someone worse off would be an act of injustice, and because 
a just man would never intentionally commit an act of injustice, he concludes that if one says 
“that a just man should harm his enemies… what he says is not true.  For it has become clear to 
us that it is never just to harm anyone.”3  Aristotle dealt with the motivation behind retribution 
when he defined anger as “an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a 
conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards one’s 
friends”.4 
The movement of international law towards collective security, as well as the moral 
criticisms of retributive justice stem from the dangers associated with the pursuit of punishment 
as its own end.  When an act of wrongdoing is committed, it sparks feelings of outrage.  The act 
of the wrongdoer demonstrates selfishness and a lack of concern and empathy for those that 
suffer by their actions.  The goal of retributive justice is to provide punishment in order to 
prevent the wrongdoer from committing the same act again in the future, as well as warning 
others that negative actions will result in similar consequences.  However, for retributive actions 
to be justified, the act or punishment must be secondary to the more important ideal of restitution 
for the victim (Day: 1978).   
One common criticism of punitive justice is that the punishments that are meted out often 
have nothing to do with restitution for the victim.  Instead, the act of punishment can easily 
become its own end, which in turn leads to punishments that may be disproportionate to the 
original crime that was committed.  The potential for disproportionate punishment is one of the 
3 See Plato’s Republic 335c-335e
4 Taken from Luban 2011 pg 28, see also Aristotle Rhetoric, 2.2, 1378a31-32
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greatest dangers associated with retributive punishments.  The death penalty, in turn, is viewed 
by its detractors as one of the most enduring examples of a harsh, puritanical reaction to 
injustice.  Critics claim that the death penalty fails to meet the criteria of a justifiable retributive 
punishment because it offers nothing more than vindictive satisfaction to those who have 
suffered as a result of the crime committed.  
Of course, most death penalty supporters see it in much different terms.  One study found 
that over 85% of death penalty supporters believed that society benefitted more when murderers 
were executed instead of being sentenced to life in prison (Ellsworth and Ross 1983:151). 
Additionally, over 90% of death penalty supporters disagreed with the statement that the death 
penalty does nothing for the victims of crime (Ellsworth and Ross 1983: 152).  Other works have 
suggested that there may be an underlying physiological mechanism that provides pleasure when 
punishment is enacted, even if it leads to some sort of loss for the one inflicting the punishment 
(Quervain et al; 2004).    
Taken together, these works suggest that supporters of the death penalty and retribution 
in general, derive pleasure from the act of punishment, and believe that society benefits, even if 
unnecessary costs are incurred in order to carry out acts of punishment.  If this is the case, then it 
is particularly dangerous in the realm of international relations, because states have often played 
the role of judge, jury, and executioner when they have been wronged by other states or entities. 
For retribution to be justifiable, it must remain proportionate to the crime, and when the 
aggrieved party is able to choose the punishment of its enemy, it will often lead to an 
overreaction as vengefulness will distort that sense of proportionality.  Luban refers to a “biased 
judgment objection” in describing this situation because “all states believe that justice lies on 
their side, and their adversary has committed abominable injustice.  And therefore the 
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punishment theory of just cause is an open invitation to self-serving, unfair, overly harsh, and 
excessive punishment” (Luban, 2011: 25).
In the context of public support for war, the retributive tendencies of society at large 
likely play an important role in determining how leaders in a democratic state will frame a 
conflict.  Given the complicated and often abstract nature of foreign policy, the average citizen 
often operates at a deficit when it comes to accurate information about potential conflicts.  The 
literature suggests that in order for citizens in a democracy to be persuaded that a conflict is 
worthwhile leaders must convince them that the conflict is within the national interest, that the 
level of risk is proportionate to the potential gains from the conflict, and that the likelihood of 
success is high as well.  However, leaders also routinely employ idealistic moral arguments that 
are intended to persuade those who might otherwise be unmoved by arguments rooted in the 
national interest (Liberman, 2006: 688).  
In the case of democracies that support the death penalty, these moral arguments are 
often framed as a matter of good versus evil.  When foreign policy matters are framed in this 
way, societal acceptance of retributive justice is a strong positive predictor for war support 
(Stein, 2011: 11).  For instance, in the case of the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, death penalty 
supporters were found to be 36% more likely to support the war compared to death penalty 
opponents (Liberman, 2006: 689).  Among American elites, death penalty support was found to 
increase both the acceptance of the invasion of Iraq, as well as tolerance for casualties 
(Liberman, 2007: 4).  
Studies related to the death penalty and foreign policy preferences suggest that there is a 
connection between support for punitive justice within the domestic sphere and support for wars 
that seek to punish those who violate international norms.  However, death penalty support alone 
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can not act as the sole identifying factor for a punitive mindset.  While many death penalty 
supporters likely do favor punishment over other means of pursuing justice, many death penalty 
advocates support capital punishment due to its perceived effectiveness.  Many believe that it 
functions as a powerful deterrent to violent crimes, while ensuring that those who are convicted 
will not be able to go free on parole or some unjust legal technicality (Ellsworth and Ross, 1983: 
156).  In one study, when the death penalty was framed as a means of society getting revenge 
against criminals, only 45% of death penalty supporters agreed (Ellsworth and Ross, 1983: 151-
52).  These findings suggest that support for both the death penalty and retribution in general is 
borne from emotion, but few supporters are willing to admit it.  
The death penalty study conducted by Ellsworth and Ross in 1983 gives the impression 
that supporters of capital punishment find many reasons for doing so, just as opponents find 
many reasons for their opposition.  While fascinating, their work is limited to the domestic 
sphere, and can only raise more questions than answers about potential foreign policy 
implications.  In contrast, the works of Stein (2011) and Liberman (2006, 2007) both seek to 
establish a link between support for capital punishment and punitive warfare.  However, they are 
limited to aggregate correlational data that does not allow us to make causal inferences.  A gap 
exists within the literature that, if filled, may allow researchers to come to a better understanding 
of attitudes towards justice, as well as how public support for war is formulated.  By employing 
individual level survey data focused solely on the relationship between attitudes towards 
punishment and foreign policy preferences, positive steps may be taken towards achieving both 
of these lofty goals.  
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3 METHODOLOGY
In May of 2012, an online survey was administered to a sample of 450 people through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mturk) program.  The mturk program allows researchers to reach a 
broad subset of people who are paid a token sum of money to participate in a survey.  Although 
it does not provide the most statistically diverse set of respondents, the mturk program does 
allow for a large, geographically diverse group to be surveyed relatively quickly and 
inexpensively.  That being said, young white males were overrepresented in this particular 
sample.  Those identifying themselves as males made up 59% of the sample, while 79% 
identified themselves as being Caucasian.  56% of respondents were between the ages of 18-29. 
The sample was also well educated, with approximately 39% of respondents having completed at 
least a 4 year college degree.  Ideologically, the respondents were left leaning, with 55% 
identifying themselves as liberal, 23% identifying themselves as conservative, and 20% 
identifying as moderates.  
After answering a set of demographic questions, respondents were asked a variety of 
questions relating to their feelings regarding the death penalty, their preferences regarding 
punishment of crime in general, as well as a battery of foreign policy questions.  A two part 
randomized experiment was included at the end of the survey to assess what types of 
relationships existed between the subjects’ previous responses and their views on a hypothetical 
situation involving a military intervention.  Ultimately, four independent variables were derived 
from the data: a punitive scale, an isolationist scale, a militarism scale as well as ideology.  It is 
expected that isolationists will generally be opposed to taking military action in the majority of 
situations, while a punitive disposition will likely lead to support for war in circumstances in 
which there is a clear “villain” that needs to be punished.
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The selection of questions was meant to test whether or not a punitive justice model 
could be developed to compete against the more commonly used militant/accommodation, 
internationalist/isolationist, and ideological models.  In total, four questions were used to assess 
punitive tendencies.  Table 1 lists the questions as well as the distribution of answers:
Table 1: Punitive Scale
Punitive Scale Oppose Support
Strongly Oppose Slight
No 
Opinion Slight Support Strongly
Do you support or oppose 
the use of the death 
penalty for people 
convicted of murder? 16% 12% 9% 10% 20% 18% 15%
Do you support of oppose 
the use of the death 
penalty for people 
convicted of crimes other 
than murder? 35% 17% 13% 12% 15% 4% 3%
Disagree Agree
We need a tougher 
approach to crime with an 
emphasis on stricter 
sentencing, capital 
punishment for more 
crimes, and fewer paroles 
for convicted felons.
Strongly Disagree
No 
Opinion Agree Strongly
27% 26% 18% 18% 11%
The best way to reduce 
crime is to punish 
criminals through long 
sentences and other 
harsh measures. 24% 27% 19% 23% 7%
Cronbach’s Alpha Test Scale:    .8114
The overall reliability of the scale is quite high (Cronbach’s alpha=.8114) which suggests 
that this set of questions does capture an underlying value of punitiveness.  The two death 
penalty questions were coded from 1-7, while the two general punishment questions were coded 
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from 1-5. In both cases, higher values were linked to greater support.5  While a majority of 
respondents favor capital punishment for murder, less than 25% of respondents were in favor of 
capital punishment for crimes other than murder.  Support for the other questions relating to 
punishment in general was only slightly higher, with approximately 30% of respondents favoring 
tougher sentences and harsher treatment for prisoners.  
In addition to the questions regarding support for punishment, several questions were 
asked regarding the extent to which respondents support American involvement in global affairs. 
The questions relating to isolationism are presented below in Table 2:
Table 2: Isolationism Scale
Isolationism Scale
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree
No 
Opinion Agree
Strongly 
Agree
The United States shouldn’t risk its citizens’ 
happiness and well-being by getting involved 
with other nations. 5% 23% 27% 32% 13%
The U.S. needs to simply mind its own business 
when it comes to international affairs. 11% 25% 24% 28% 12%
Cronbach's Alpha Test Scale:  .7568
The overall strength of the isolationism scale is high (Cronbach’s alpha=.7568), which 
again indicates that these questions tap into an underlying trend regarding support or opposition 
to American involvement with other nations.  As was the case with the individual components of 
the punitive scale, responses to the isolationist questions were coded from 1-5, with higher 
values indicating greater agreement with the statements presented.  Both of the isolationist 
5 An alternative coding of the Punitive variable was also used in which each of the variables was recoded into 
interval variables with a total range of 0-1.  This was done to further ensure the reliability of the scale.  The 
substantive effect of the scale remained the same regardless of which version was used, hence the omission of the 
alternative variable from any of the models.
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questions used had similar results, with approximately 40% of respondents agreeing that the 
United States should avoid becoming too involved with the affairs of other nations.  
      Finally, a number of questions were asked which assessed the degree to which militarism 
was present in the minds of the respondents.  Ultimately, three questions were used to form the 
basis of the militarism scale.  The questions and their distribution of responses are listed below in 
table 3:
Table 3: Militarism Scale
Militarism Scale
Strongly Disagree
No 
Opinion Agree
Strongly 
Agree
It is necessary to strike at the heart of America’s 
enemies.  14% 29% 28% 24% 6%
The United States needs a strong military to be 
effective in international relations. 8% 19% 20% 36% 16%
The United States should take all steps including 
the use of force to prevent aggression by any 
expansionist power. 11% 27% 31% 26% 5%
Cronbach's Alpha Test Scale:  .7381
As was the case with the punitive and isolationism scales, higher values of the variables 
within the scale are linked to greater amounts of support (coded 1-5).  The resulting scale shows 
strong significance (Cronbach’s alpha is .7381).  While a majority support the idea of the United 
States having a strong military in general (52% support), there was less agreement among 
respondents regarding the other questions, as only 30% of respondents were in favor of striking 
at the heart of American enemies.  Both the militarism and isolationist scales also produced large 
swaths of people who chose to express no opinion on the subject of foreign policy (typically 
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around 25% or so) which was a good deal higher than those who chose not to express an opinion 
in regards to the more domestically oriented questions about crime and punishment.    
In addition to scales measuring militarism, isolationism and moral punitiveness, ideology 
represents another important independent variable when explaining support for war.  Within the 
dataset, the variable Ideology has a range of 1-3, with 1 representing those who described 
themselves as anything between slightly and strongly liberal.  2 represents those who identified 
as moderates, and 3 represents those who identified as anything between slightly and strongly 
conservative.
The first test that was run was a comparison of the effects of the four independent 
variables in a variety of general military scenarios.  Respondents were asked if they would be 
willing to support the use of American military force in six different scenarios.  In each of these 
scenarios, respondents had a choice of 5 answers with 1 representing strong opposition, and 5 
representing strong support for the action in question.  In addition the respondents were 
randomly assigned into two groups.  One group saw each scenario framed with the use of Air 
Strikes, while the other group saw each scenario framed with Ground Troops.
The choice was made to use two different frames to measure the extent to which higher 
levels of American involvement might affect the levels of support across different dispositional 
perspectives.  Previous research has found both that mission type and the extent of missions have 
a significant impact on support (see Jentleson 1992: Nincic 1997 & Jentleson and Briton 1998). 
The scenarios were divided into two basic classifications, humanitarian and security related 
interventions.  The results of the humanitarian scenarios are displayed in Table 4.
Models 4.1 and 4.2 are devoted to a scenario in which a foreign government commits acts 
of mass murder or genocide against its own population.  Model 4.1 includes each of the main 
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scale variables, as well as ideology and the effects of the ground troop versus air strikes frame. 
As one would expect, given the lack of clearly defined American interests, both isolationism and 
conservatism (ideology is coded so that higher values link to self described conservatives) were 
linked with opposition to the idea of using American forces to prevent a government from killing 
its own citizens.  Militarism had a positive, highly significant, and powerful effect on support for 
the use of force.  On the other hand, the punitive variable failed to reach significance, and there 
was no statistically significant difference in responses between the ground troops and air strikes 
frames, as indicated by the weakness of the ground troops variable in the model.
Model 4.2 is nearly identical to 4.1 except for the omission of the militarism scale. 
Militarism was removed in order to assess whether or not it was minimizing the effect of the 
punitive variable in model 4.1.  In the case of stopping genocide, however, this does not appear 
to be the case, and overall, the results are very similar in both models despite the removal of the 
militarism scale.
Models 4.3 and 4.4 test the respondents’ attitudes towards assisting a democracy in 
overthrowing a dictatorship.  In model 4.3, both isolationism and conservatism were strongly 
linked to opposition to the use of American force, while militarism was related to support for
intervention.  As compared to the air strikes frame, the suggestion of using ground troops to 
assist in a democratic movement actually produced a negative, significant effect among 
respondents.  
In model 4.4, the militarism scale is removed once again, and this time, the omission 
allows the punitive scale to become positive and highly significant, which indicates that in this 
type of situation, a punitive disposition may be activated by the idea of punishing an illegitimate 
leader.  However, it seems unusual that this relationship exists in the help democracy scenario, 
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but not in the stop genocide scenario, despite the obvious similarities.  Isolationism remained 
negative and significant, while the effects of ground troops and ideology were weakened.
Table 4: Linear Regression Results of Humanitarian Interventions
Humanitarian Military Interventions
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
Stop 
Genocide
Stop 
Genocide
Help 
Democracy
Help 
Democracy
Ground troops 0.0274 0.0330 -0.198* -0.194+
(0.101) (0.106) (0.0976) (0.101)
Punitive -0.0517 0.0679 0.0490 0.146***
(0.0477) (0.0456) (0.0460) (0.0435)
Militarism 0.406*** -- 0.328*** --
(0.0645) -- (0.0623) --
Isolationism -0.115* -0.199*** -0.215*** -0.282***
(0.0506) (0.0509) (0.0488) (0.0486)
Ideology -0.251*** -0.198** -0.140* -0.0975
(0.0694) (0.0719) (0.0670) (0.0686)
_cons 3.436*** 4.459*** 2.896*** 3.724***
(0.262) (0.214) (0.253) (0.204)
N 440 440 440 440
Standard errors in parentheses
="+ p<0.10  * p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"  
In the next set of scenarios, respondents dealt with military situations related to general 
security issues that were more closely tied in to American interests than the humanitarian 
oriented scenarios.  Table 5 shows the results of the regression analyses of these scenarios.
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Table 5: Linear Regression Results of Interests Based Military Interventions
Interests Based Military Interventions
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8
Kill 
Terrorists
Kill 
Terrorists
Expand 
Land
Expand 
Land
Protect 
Oil
Protect 
Oil
Support 
Dictator
Support 
Dictator
Ground 
troops -0.165+ -0.156 0.116 0.119 0.104 0.110 0.00375 0.00858
(0.0858) (0.0977) (0.0926) (0.0936) (0.0953) (0.105) (0.0995) (0.105)
Punitive 0.0130 0.197*** 0.142** 0.198*** 0.120** 0.293*** 0.0669 0.193***
(0.0404) (0.0423) (0.0436) (0.0404) (0.0448) (0.0453) (0.0468) (0.0451)
Militarism 0.626*** 0.189** 0.588*** 0.428***
(0.0547) (0.0591) (0.0607) (0.0635)
Isolationis
m -0.111** -0.239*** 0.0337
-
0.00516 0.0272
-
0.0937+ -0.0594 -0.147**
(0.0429) (0.0472) (0.0463) (0.0452) (0.0476) (0.0506) (0.0497) (0.0504)
Ideology -0.00803 0.0738 0.118+ 0.143* 0.149* 0.225** 0.0880 0.146*
(0.0589) (0.0666) (0.0636) (0.0638) (0.0653) (0.0714) (0.0684) (0.0713)
_cons 2.177*** 3.755*** 0.526* 1.003*** 0.0644 1.547*** 0.831** 1.906***
(0.222) (0.198) (0.240) (0.190) (0.247) (0.213) (0.257) (0.212)
N 440 440 440 440 438 438 438 438
Standard errors in parentheses
="+ p<0.10  * p<0.05 ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"
Models 5.1 and 5.2 measure respondents’ attitudes towards using the American military 
to attack terrorists and destroy their bases or camps.  In model 5.1, militarism continues to be a 
powerful indicator of support, with a strong coefficient and a high level of significance.  Using 
ground troops to fight terrorists caused a slightly significant, negative reaction among 
respondents, which may be explained by a general tendency towards war weariness given 
American war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade.  When the militarism scale is 
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removed from the analysis in model 5.2, the punitive scale becomes positive and highly 
significant while very little changed amongst the other variables.  
Models 5.3 and 5.4 measure respondents’ support for using the American military to help 
an American ally expand its territory.  In model 5.3, both the militarism and punitive scales were 
positive and significant.  The significance of the punitive scale is particularly surprising, given 
the fact that assisting an ally in expanding their territory makes no mention of punishing evil or 
provides any other justification for using force.  When militarism is removed in model 5.4, the 
punitive scale remains positive while ideology becomes significant and positive as well.  One 
possible explanation could be that ideology, militarism, and the punitive scale are linked to some 
extent by an underlying motivation towards supporting American interests.  However, the 
expand land scenario does little to explain how helping an ally expand their territory would be 
helpful to American interests, other than presumably hurting an enemy of the United States while 
making an ally more powerful.
While the expand land scenario does not make the presence of American interests 
entirely clear, the scenario used in models 5.5 and 5.6 does.  In that scenario, respondents were 
asked to answer whether or not they would support the use of American force to ensure that the 
United States’ supply of oil could not be threatened by another group.  The results are similar to 
the expand land scenario, both the militarism and punitive scales are positive and significant in 
model 5.5.  Ideology is also positive and significant, with a slightly higher coefficient than was 
found in either expand land scenario.  In model 5.6, the results are roughly the same without the 
militarism scale; the notable changes being a slight increase in the strength of both ideology and 
the punitive scale.  
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The final pair of models dealt with the respondents’ attitudes towards assisting a friendly 
dictatorship seeking to suppress an anti-American democratic movement.  In model 5.7 the 
militarism scale is highly significant and positive, while none of the other variables were 
significant.  When militarism is removed in model 5.8 however, the punitive scale becomes 
highly significant and positive, while both ideology and the isolationism scale also become 
significant.  What is surprising about model 5.8 is that the punitive scale seems to be going in the 
wrong direction, because even an anti-American democratic movement could be viewed as more 
just and more deserving of support than even the friendliest tyrant.  The positive coefficient of 
the ideology variable and the fact that ideology and the punitive scale both became positive and 
significant when militarism was removed suggests that the relationship between these three 
variables is perhaps more intertwined than was initially expected.                  
In terms of the overall responses, each dispositional perspective seems to exhibit the 
expected traits.  Isolationists were opposed to every scenario, while conservatives were more 
likely to support interventions that involved American interests, such as protecting oil, while 
being opposed to interventions that were less clearly aligned with the national interest, such as 
stopping genocide.  Militarism was most supportive across all of the scenarios, suggesting that 
the militarism scale taps into the ‘trigger-happy’ part of respondents’ mindsets.  What seems less 
clear is how the punitive scale can be used to form generalizable theories based on the results 
from these scenarios.  In situations in which a clear villain could be drawn (genocide, helping 
democracy, killing terrorists and protecting a friendly dictator), the punitive scale garners mixed 
results.  Sometimes those who are high on the punitive scale support the promotion of retributive 
justice (helping democracy, killing terrorists), while at other times they seem to favor promoting 
injustice (protecting dictator) or their attitudes are simply unclear (stopping genocide). 
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Moreover, while the presence or absence of the militarism scale had effects on all of the 
variables, it seems to particularly impact the level of significance found in the punitive scale.   
These results indicate that punishment and general militarism are closely aligned.  The 
relationship may in fact be more tightly aligned than punitiveness and conservatism, given the 
fact that the two variables seem to differ when American interests are not present in a potential 
military intervention.  While it is not certain, it may be possible that a disposition towards moral 
punitiveness may in fact be an underlying trait of those who take a militant stance towards 
foreign affairs in general.6  The final part of the survey seeks to address the relationship of 
punitiveness towards the other independent variables in a more controlled fashion.
4 EXPERIMENT RESULTS
The experiment within the survey consists of two parts, which were meant to mimic 
certain aspects of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  This conflict was chosen for several reasons: the 
first is that it provides an opportunity to use experimental data to examine Peter Liberman’s 
(2006, 2007) theories regarding moral punitiveness surrounding the Persian Gulf War.  It also 
provides an interesting scenario to test the punitive model on its own, because while many would 
agree that the initial intervention to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait was necessary and 
justifiable, the subsequent calls by some for a further invasion of Iraq to forcibly remove Saddam 
Hussein from power enjoyed far less support.  Yet those calls for vengeance against the Iraqi 
regime highlight the often blurry line between restitution and revenge that has made retributive 
wars so controversial.  
6 Alpha testing of the individual components of the punitive scale and the militarism scale put together yielded a test 
scale of .8286.  However, exploratory factor analysis was conducted which produced three distinct factors, which 
correlated with the individual components of the scaled variables i.e. death penalty, general harsh punishments for 
crime, and militarism.  While there may be an underlying connection between militarism and punitiveness, it will 
require more work to fully explain what that connection may be.
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The first part of the experiment mimics the actual conditions surrounding the 1991 
Persian Gulf War.  Respondents were told that an aggressive regime had attacked its neighbor 
without provocation and was likely to conquer them if the United States did not join a global 
coalition working to stop the invasion.  Table 6 shows the results of a linear regression for the 
first part of the experiment.  Despite the severity of the situation and the complete support of the 
international community, both ideology and the isolationist scale had negative relationships with 
the first part of the experiment.  While the punitive scale had a slightly negative coefficient, the 
relationship was not significant.  Militarism however, had a strong, positive, significant 
relationship.  The lack of a significant relationship from the punitive scale is unexpected because 
the wording of the question makes it clear who the wrongdoer is and specifies that at the least, 
the United States will not be alone in attacking this foe.
One potential reason why the first part of the experiment lacks support may be because 
the question was worded in a way that made no mention of things that might pertain to American 
interests, such as either of the countries being an ally of the United States, or whether or not 
significant natural resources were at stake, as they were in the original Persian Gulf conflict. 
While the militarism scale seems to be capturing the dynamic of hawkishness, the lack of 
significant results from the punitive scale suggests that the relationship between retribution and 
support for war may be tempered to a large degree by the presence or absence of American 
interests.
Given the lack of support in the first part of the experiment, it may seem doubtful that 
support will exist for the second part which depicts an escalation of the use of force. 
Respondents were told that following a successful intervention, the aggressor state had retreated
21
Table 6: Linear Regression of Experiment Part 1
Linear regression of Experiment Part 1
Model 6.1
Experiment Part 1
Punitive -0.0543
(0.0572)
Militarism 0.418***
(0.0777)
Ideology -0.408***
(0.0834)
Isolationism -0.378***
(0.0606)
_cons 5.818***
(0.312)
N 438
Standard errors in parentheses
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01
 *** 
p<0.001"
from its neighboring country and ended its attack.  With a weakened military, the aggressor state 
could be easily conquered, and that it would likely attempt to invade its neighbor again if given 
the chance.  Respondents were then asked if they would support further military operations 
against the aggressor state.
Within that question, three conditions were controlled for, using a two by two by two 
factorial design which yielded eight different versions of the question.  Table 7 lists those 
conditions:
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Table 7: Experimental Control Conditions
Condition 1. Condition 2. Condition 3.
International Support Punish/Prevent Casualties
1. Yes Prevent No
2. Yes Punish No
3. Yes Prevent Yes
4. Yes Punish Yes
5. No Prevent Yes
6. No Punish No
7. No Prevent No
8. No Punish Yes
Each condition was randomly assigned in half of all cases.  For instance, half of all 
respondents were given the ‘punish’ frame, while the other half received the ‘preventive’ frame. 
Around 1/8 of the sample received the most extreme case, in which they were asked if they 
would support a unilateral American invasion of the aggressor state in which civilian casualties 
were certain to occur in order to punish the aggressor state for its past actions.  Another 1/8 
received the least extreme example, in which the United States would have implied international 
support for an invasion meant to prevent future attacks in which no mention of civilian casualties 
was made.
Model 8.1 shows the overall results of the second part of the experiment across all 
conditions.  Compared to model 6.1, ideology loses its significance, while the isolationism scale 
remains negative; however, the punitive scale has not only become highly significant, but has 
Table 8: Experiment Part 2 Linear Regression Results
Experiment Results
Model 8.1 Model 8.2 Model 8.3
Punitive
.2100***
(.0662)
.1657*
(.0808) -.2558
23
(.2003)
Militarism .5386***
(.0897)
.5317***
(.0900)
.4682**
(.1377)
Isolationism -.1698*
(.0702)
-.1677*
(.0703)
-.1614
(.1027)
Ideology -.0310
(.0964)
-.0260
(.0965)
-.0502
(.1460)
Casualties -.3801**
(.1413)
-.6965†
(.3587)
-1.369**
(.4820)
Punish -.3290*
(.1404)
-.3336*
(.1405)
-.2558
(.2003)
Intl. Support .2455†
(1408)
.2461†
(.1409)
--
Interaction of Casualties and 
Punitive
.1042
.1086
.4012**
(.1502)
N 438 438 203
Standard Errors in parentheses 
=” †p<0.1  *p<.05  **p<.001  ***p<0.001”
also had a solid increase in its effect.  This is somewhat surprising, given the fact that the 
punitive scale had an insignificant relationship with the first part of the experiment when clearly 
the aggressor nation was at fault and (in the eyes of many) deserved punishment for its actions. 
Furthermore, the large body of literature surrounding public support for war has almost always 
found that missions with limited policy objectives, dealing with cross border aggression, are 
supported more often than those that require a full on invasion as in the case of the second part of 
the experiment.
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One way to explain the unexpected gap in the punitive scale’s significance between part 1 
and part 2 of the experiment might be based around the perceived chance of success.  Based off 
of the recent work of Gelpi et al (2009) which found that higher prospects of success can often 
mitigate the presumed dangers of a military strike, it could be argued that despite the more 
extensive level of involvement that an invasion would entail, the fact that the aggressor state had 
already suffered one defeat, and had been severely weakened overall, may instill a greater sense 
of confidence that an invasion would be successful.  Compare that situation to the first part of the 
experiment in which it is made clear that even a multilateral attempt at stopping the aggressor 
state would likely fail without American military support, and it becomes plausible that 
respondents would be unsure whether or not supporting an intervention on behalf of a state they 
know nothing about (since the question tells them nothing about the invaded state) would be 
worth the potential costs.  Thus perhaps it is unsurprising that only the most ardent advocates of 
American military power would be willing to support the first part of the experiment. 
While the significant, positive relationship between the overall experiment and the 
punitive scale is important, it does not fully capture the dynamic of punitiveness and the other 
conditions.   Models 8.2 and 8.3 show the interactive effect of the punitive scale with the 
casualties condition within the experiment.  Model 8.2 is identical to model 8.1, with the 
exception that casualties and the punitive scale are regressed as an interaction term.  This 
interaction was chosen to test out the effects of casualties on those with the most strongly 
punitive dispositions.  Unfortunately the interaction term failed to gain significance in model 8.2. 
Further tests were conducted and it was found that the punish frame had little effect on the 
punitive scale.  However, the international support frame does appear to have an impact on those 
with a punitive disposition (the presence of international support seems to hurt support among 
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those with a punitive disposition).  Thus in model 8.3, the effects of the international support 
control variable are isolated by stipulating that only the responses in which international support 
is not present be used.  When this is done, model 8.3 demonstrates that when casualties and the 
punitive scale interact, not only will casualties fail to dampen the support among those with 
punitive dispositions, it actually increases it.
The relative size of the coefficient is fairly large.  What is most noteworthy however is 
the fact that the increase in the coefficient promotes the alarming idea that punitivists might be 
more supportive of a war that they know will kill civilians.  This distinction could be explained 
by the general mindset of retribution touched upon by Aristotle and succinctly stated by Luban 
that “vengeful rage has no logical stopping point internal to itself.”7 Furthermore, any retributive 
punishment in the theatre of war will also inevitably be a collective punishment8 in which anyone 
may be found culpable for the crimes of the regime.  So perhaps it should come as no surprise 
that the specific inclusion of casualties not only failed to deter punitivists, but in fact caused an 
increase in support.
The relationship between casualties and the punitive scale necessitated further analysis, 
so a linear combination of estimators test was performed using the coefficients generated in 
model 8.3 by the interaction of casualties and the punitive scale.  Since model 8.3 used linear 
regression to analyze the data, it was already assumed that there was a linear relationship 
between the variables.  By using a linear combination test, it is possible to measure the extent to 
which the marginal effect of casualties is influenced by individual values on the punitive scale. 
Figure 1 displays a graph with the results of that analysis:   
7 Luban, 2011: 32
8 Ibid, 36
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Figure 1: Graph of the Interaction between Casualties and the Punitive Scale
At the lowest levels of the punitive scale, the interaction of casualties causes a substantial 
(-.9679) drop in support for the invasion featured in experiment two.  This drop is significant at 
the 0.01 level.  Such a drop should be expected; especially considering the non-casualties frame 
makes no mention of possible human suffering as a result of the invasion.  As the punitive scale 
moves into the middle of its range, the interactive effect loses significance.  However, the 
coefficient begins to shift from a negative value to a positive one, ultimately culminating in a 
substantial (1.038) increase in support for the invasion amongst the most ardent supporters of 
punitive justice when casualties are mentioned.  The value of the coefficient is significant at the 
0.05 level.
The results of the experiment were unanticipated to say the least.  While it was expected 
that punitivists would have a higher degree of casualty tolerance than other groups, the 
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possibility that knowledge of expected civilian casualties would actually increase support for war 
was never considered.  The weakness of the punish frame is also unexpected, but perhaps it 
should not be.  Regardless of whether the punish or preventive frame was given in the 
experiment, the outcome was the same: the destruction of the military capabilities of the targeted 
regime.  This suggests that at least in this situation, the framing of the intervention had little 
effect among those who are most supportive of punitive justice.  Perhaps if the outcome 
associated with the punish or prevent frame had been different, the effect on punitivists would 
have been different as well.  Finally, the role of international support was unusual.  Although 
international support had a generally positive, though admittedly weak effect on the experiment 
overall, the effect among punitivists seems to be negative, given the results of model 8.3, as well 
as 6.1.  Not only do punitivists support the use of force as a means of doing great harm to a 
perceived enemy of the United States, they also seem to prefer to do it unilaterally.  
5 CONCLUSION
This study sought to explain how a punitive disposition interacted with other 
dispositional frameworks as well as common situational factors to determine mass public support 
for military conflicts.  The results of the two part experiment as well as the generalized military 
scenarios contained within the survey offer several insights into the manner in which moral 
punitiveness affects support for foreign conflicts.
It is clear that the punitive scale has a significant impact on attitudes across a wide range 
of military scenarios.  Utilizing several linear regression models, support for punitive justice was 
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positively associated with military force aiming to help democracies overcome dictators (model 
4.4), combat terrorism (model 5.2), assist allies in expanding their territory (models 5.3 and 5.4), 
protecting American oil supplies (model 5.6) and helping a friendly dictatorial regime repress an 
anti-American democratic movement (model 5.8).  In so far as situational factors are concerned, 
supporters of punitive justice seem comfortable using force in a wide array of situations in which 
American interests are likely present, but not always explicitly mentioned.  The perceived level 
of interest could explain why supporters of punitive justice were in favor of helping dictators 
some times, while helping democracies at others, while avoiding involvement in genocidal 
conflicts altogether.   
Although the level of risk was not mentioned in the generic military scenarios, the 
models presented in tables 4 and 5 did attempt to introduce risk in a controlled fashion by 
varying the frame received by respondents.  It was assumed that if a respondent received the 
ground troops frame, they would intuitively consider such an operation to be risky, and 
potentially far more costly than they would feel if some other frame were presented.  As tables 4 
and 5 show however, the ground troop frame had little effect on respondents as a whole.  Further 
analyses were attempted, including using linear regression to search for any interactions between 
the ground troops frame and the punitive scale, but no significant interactions were found.  The 
one case in which risk may have affected support for a conflict among supporters of punitive 
justice was in the first experiment featured in model 6.1.  However, the results in that case are 
not entirely clear since the coefficient generated by the punitive scale was insignificant, rather 
then negative and significant.
In the limited context of this particular survey, general situational factors had little effect 
on the punitive scale.  This was to be expected to some extent, because information regarding the 
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extent to which any action was in the interest of the United States was intentionally minimized in 
many of the military scenarios in order to better understand how the dispositional tendencies of 
respondents would affect their reaction to generally ambiguous military scenarios.  The 
situational factors that were used in the second part of the experiment were varied in a controlled 
fashion, though again, none of the variables in either portion of the experiment would generally 
be considered part of the national interest.  This makes the high levels of support exhibited by the 
punitive and militarism scales, as well as the negative relationships of isolationism and ideology 
much more compelling.  What remains difficult to explain is exactly how to distinguish between 
the effects of each dispositional scale across the range of scenarios presented in this study.
For instance, as the results show in tables 4 and 5, the effect of the militarism scale was 
generally the most powerful of all of the dispositional factors.  While isolationism tended to be 
negative and significant regardless of the presence of the militarism scale, the punitive scale 
seemed much more susceptible to the effects of the inclusion or removal of the militarism scale. 
In the case of models 4.3 and 4.4, the removal of the militarism scale not only caused a fairly 
large spike in the coefficient of the punitive scale, it also caused a huge shift in significance 
(from no significance to being significant at the 0.001 level).  While it seems apparent that there 
is a relationship between the punitive scale and militarism, it remains unclear how the two can 
properly be disentangled.  For instance, the theoretical basis for justifying punishment as a 
method of foreign policy would suggest that having a clear cut villainous leader or regime would 
be critical in garnering support for a conflict.  However, both the punitive and militarism scales 
tended to be positive across a wide array of conditions, even those that would involve the United 
States supporting the perceived villain.  While it could be theorized that conservatism is the 
underlying factor between both dispositions, the evidence from this data set shows that 
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conservatives were sometimes opposed to the same conflicts that militarist supporters favored 
(see models 4.3, and 6.1).  At best it could be said that conservatism lines up with the punitive 
and militarism scales only in matters that clearly serve the national interest.
What remains then is a complex puzzle relating punitivists with militarists, with few clear 
ways in which to separate them.  As far as this particular dataset is concerned, the most 
substantial difference seems to lie in how each disposition interprets the casualties frame.  As 
figure 1 showed above, the marginal effect of casualties amongst those with a highly punitive 
disposition is increased support for the military intervention featured in models 8.1-8.3.  What 
may be possible is that while militarists support the use of force for reasons related to national 
security or the expression of American power, perhaps punitivists view it from a moral 
perspective of correcting perceived injustices or reestablishing the moral balance between those 
whose actions are right and just (us) and whose actions are wrong and unjust (anyone who goes 
against us).  This could explain why punitivists side with friendly dictators sometimes and rising 
democracies at others.  Or why they support our allies’ expansion of land yet choose not to take 
action when countries they do not care about are invaded by other nations (i.e. model 6.1).  The 
relationship with casualties, accompanied by the huge spike in support for model 8.1, might 
suggest that once punitivists become in engaged in a war, it becomes a total war in which victory 
is defined only when the enemy has no chance of fighting back.  Just as punitivists support 
irrevocable capital punishment for those guilty of violating domestic norms, so too will they 
support disproportionate, collective punishments against regimes or their citizens who violate 
international norms that the United States is concerned with.  Undoubtedly, more research is 
needed to better understand the role of a punitive disposition in regards to foreign policy 
preferences.
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